The integration of complex information in working memory, and its effect on capacity, shape the limits of conscious cognition. The literature conflicts on whether short-term visual memory represents information as integrated objects. A change-detection paradigm using objects defined by color with location or shape was used to investigate binding in short-term visual memory. Results showed that features from the same dimension compete for capacity, whereas features from different dimensions can be stored in parallel. Binding between these features can occur, but focused attention is required to create and maintain the binding over time, and this integrated format is vulnerable to interference. In the proposed model, working memory capacity is limited both by the independent capacity of simple feature stores and by demands on attention networks that integrate this distributed information into complex but unified thought objects.
Working memory and attention are processes at the core of what we mean when we say we are "thinking." Understanding the nature of representations held in working memory is of fundamental importance for understanding the limits to conscious cognition. The concept of working memory often includes both the shortterm maintenance of task-relevant information and the active rehearsal and manipulation of this information (Cohen et al., 1997; Smith & Jonides, 1999) . Much of mental life involves the manipulation of relations and associations within complex entities ranging from perceptual objects and images to abstract propositions. The mechanisms that maintain these associations or bindings within working memory are essential to efficient functioning. In this study we used a simple visual change-detection paradigm to explore the integration or binding of visual features in visual short-term memory. Although this research uses tools and terminology from visual attention research, the model we have proposed addresses the general question of how any kind of complex integrated thought object is created and maintained in working memory. Baddeley (1992; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974 ) first proposed a model of working memory with a set of specialized temporary stores-a phonological loop for verbal information and a visuospatial sketchpad-that hold information while it is manipulated by a main "central executive" system in the performance of a currently relevant task. Double dissociations found in dual-task performance by normal participants, in brain imaging studies, and in patients with selective lesions support the separation of working memory into separate visual and verbal components (for a review see Della Sala & Logie, 1993; . There is also evidence that visual working memory is itself subdivided. Behavioral studies (e.g., Logie & Marchetti, 1991; Tresch, Sinnamon, & Seamon, 1993) and neuroimaging studies (Courtney, Ungerleider, Keil, & Haxby, 1996; McCarthy et al., 1996) have argued for separate specialized areas for visual object information and for spatial information. Visual working memory is distinguished from the more fleeting but detailed iconic memory, which lasts only a few hundred milliseconds, has a much larger capacity, and is susceptible to interference by masking (Pashler, 1988; Phillips, 1974) . Visuospatial working memory can last for seconds and is independent of retinotopic location. Moving the visual pattern or the eyes between study and test does not degrade performance as it does for iconic storage.
A number of experiments have shown that visual short-term memory, like verbal working memory, is drastically limited in capacity, typically to around three or four objects. Striking examples of these limits are found in people's failures to notice large changes in visual scenes, changes that are obvious once attention is directed to them (O'Regan, Rensink, & Clark, 1999; Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997; Simons, 1996; Simons & Levin, 1997) . Prominent objects in scenes can disappear, change color, or move between one display and the next without people noticing the changes, a phenomenon that has been dubbed change blindness. These observations conflict with the phenomenal experience one has of a rich visual world persisting in memory. However, O'Regan (1992) pointed out that the visual world is generally stable and so may be relied on as a continuously available "external memory," accessible for reference at any moment by a simple movement of the eyes or attention back to the aspect of interest. Therefore, he argued, there is no need to laboriously encode veridical photographlike representations of the visual scene. We remember less from a visual scene than we think we do.
What are the bases of this severe limit to the capacity of working memory? In what format is visual information stored in short-term memory? Are visual features, which are bound together during visual perception to create object percepts, also maintained in similar bound units during memory? Although the perceptual aspect of the binding problem has been the subject of much research and theorizing (see reviews by Treisman, 1996 Treisman, , 1999 Von der Malsburg, 1995) , less work has been done on the shortterm maintenance and retrieval of the bindings. The binding problem is the general question of how any kind of distributed information is integrated by the massively parallel brain to ultimately result in the experience of unitary thought objects, such as an episodic memory, a percept, or an action sequence. In the context of perception, the binding problem relates to how distributed neural codes representing various parts and properties of a visual scene are recombined so that one perceives the correct objects, such as a red apple beside a green leaf rather than a red leaf and a green apple (Treisman & Schmidt, 1982) . Feature integration theory (Treisman, 1993 (Treisman, , 1999 Treisman & Gelade, 1980) hypothesizes that correctly conjoining attributes into an integrated object percept requires the sequential allocation of focused attention to areas in space, enabling features belonging to the same object to be linked through their shared spatial location. The conjoined features may be entered into an object file (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992) , defined as an updateable representation of a particular object at a given time and place. The file maintains the object's identity if it moves or its properties change, enabling the experience of unitary objects persisting across space and time.
The binding problem is not just a question for visual attention researchers. Several authors have suggested that object files (or similar constructs) may also be the units maintained in short-term visual memory (Irwin & Andrews, 1996; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Rensink, 2000b; Treisman, 1992) . The concept of binding multiple visual elements into one unit in memory is an example of the more general idea of chunking articulated by George Miller (1956) . Through various methods of grouping and organization, more and more bits of information are incorporated into one chunk, and consequently more total bits are remembered. Memory capacity is limited by the number of chunks, whereas the span of memory is virtually independent of the number of bits of information per chunk. Luck and Vogel (1997) inferred a form of chunking in visual memory from a series of studies suggesting that visual memory is limited by the number of objects but relatively unconstrained by the number of distinguishable features that make up those objects. In their first study, they flashed arrays of 1 to 12 colored squares for 100 ms. Following a 900-ms blank interval, they presented a test array that was either identical to the original display or differed from it by the color of one of the squares (randomly chosen on each trial). To determine if the test display was the same as the initial display, participants had to accurately maintain the relevant visual information from the original display during the delay period. Accuracy was almost perfect for displays with one, two, and three colored squares but declined at a set size of four ( Figure  1A ). The authors calculated that visual memory has a limited capacity of about three or four items.
In further studies, Luck and Vogel (1997) extended their results to objects defined by multiple feature values. 1 In one study squares each composed of two different colors were presented ( Figure 1B ). In another study lines of different orientation and color were presented ( Figure 1C ). Each study had three blocked conditions. For the orientation-color study, participants were told that in one block the color of one of the lines might be changed at test, whereas in a second block only the orientation of a line might be changed. For the display shown in Figure 1C , both tasks required participants to remember a total of 4 features (four colors or four orientations). In a third and crucial "conjunction" block, either the color or the orientation could be changed, forcing participants to remember 8 features, that is, twice as many total features. An additional study extended the test to objects each characterized by 4 features, resulting in a total of 16 features forming four objects. In all cases, the limit to performance was based on the number of objects rather than the number of relevant features present. The authors suggested that visual working memory holds about three or four bound objects in a fully integrated format, each with a possibly unlimited number of distinguishable features. Irwin (1991 Irwin ( , 1992 Irwin & Andrews, 1996) had previously reached the same conclusion through his investigations of transsaccadic memory. When viewing a visual scene, people's eyes make rapid saccadic movements from one point to another, yet their experience of the visual world does not appear similarly disrupted. Irwin investigated how the brain maintains a stable percept of the world despite this frequently changing retinal input. One intuitive hypothesis is that the brain carries a detailed "iconic" 1 We use the terms feature dimension and feature value as they are commonly used in the attention literature. For example, red is a feature value along the feature dimension of color. What should be considered a feature dimension is a matter of much research. Some commonly accepted dimensions include color, orientation, and direction of motion (see Treisman, 1986) . Figure 1 . Sample displays and data adapted from Luck and Vogel (1997) . Each different fill pattern represents a different solid color. Squares are not drawn to scale. A: Change-detection accuracy decreases as the number of squares presented for memory increases. B and C: Accuracy scores decrease as a function of the number of different objects presented and not as a function of the number of features. Adapted from "The Capacity of Visual Working Memory for Features and Conjunctions," by S. J. E. K. Vogel, 1997, Nature, 390, p. 280. Copyright 1997 by Nature. Adapted with permission. copy of the visual scene from one fixation and then fuses it, through spatial calculations, with equally detailed views from subsequent fixations (McConkie & Rayner, 1976) . This idea, which Irwin called the spatiotopic fusion hypothesis, proved to be incorrect (Irwin, Yantis, & Jonides, 1983) . Rather than a highcapacity representation coded in absolute spatial terms, transsaccadic memory involves a location-independent, slowly decaying representation that is limited in capacity to about three or four items.
In further explorations, Irwin (1991) had participants view a random dot pattern in one fixation and then move their eyes and determine if a second dot pattern was the same or different from the first. Neither varying the delay interval from 40 ms to as long as 5,000 ms nor changing the spatial displacement of the pattern had a strong effect on memory performance. However, increasing the number of dots in the pattern did impair accuracy. In another series of studies, arrays of colored letters were presented until participants initiated a saccade. A partial report cue then probed one position at random, and participants recalled the letter and color at that position. There was a high contingency between color and letter identification for correct responses, suggesting, according to Irwin, that these features are stored together as integrated wholes rather than as separate features. From the number of letters remembered, Irwin calculated the limit of transsaccadic memory to be about three or four objects. Ceraso (1985) had also previously investigated unit formation in perception and memory. Testing incidental memory without verbal encoding, Ceraso found that memory for features such as shape and outline pattern or shape and color were remembered more accurately if the features were presented together as a coherent unit in the initial display than if they were presented separately, even when the spatial proximity of the features was equated.
Thus many investigators using different methods with various display and delay intervals have arrived at similar conclusions concerning the nature of visual working memory storage. There is a form of short-term visual memory, different from iconic memory, that has a limited capacity of about three or four items and that, they argue, stores objects as bound units.
However, there is some contrary evidence that suggests that features may not remain bound together in visual memory without extra effort. Perhaps the most dramatic claims were made by Wolfe (1999) and Horowitz and Wolfe (1998) , who suggested that the visual system is amnesic; as soon as attention is withdrawn, features collapse back into their unstructured parts. Rensink's (2000a Rensink's ( , 2000b coherence theory also posited that without attention, an explicit object percept falls into its constituent parts. An earlier study by Treisman, Sykes, and Gelade (1977) directly investigated whether features that have been perceptually bound remain conjoined in visual memory. In a perceptual matching task, they presented two colored letters (or, in another experiment, schematic faces with different noses, eyes, and mouths) followed by two more for immediate test. Participants were asked to determine whether the test display contained an object exactly matching an object presented in the initial display. The greatest number of errors and the slowest reaction times occurred on trials that had no exactly matching objects but had wrongly paired features, all of which were present in the original display. For example, a smiling face with round eyes and a frowning face with square eyes at study were followed by a smiling face with square eyes and a frowning face with round eyes at test. The large number of errors (33% in one study) on these binding trials suggests a tendency for the objects to break up into their separate features. Participants were unable to consistently maintain even just two stable, wellintegrated objects for these brief intervals in memory. Stefurak and Boynton (1986) came to a similar conclusion. They presented colored outlines of animals for 5 s, followed after 3 or 15 s by a single test item for recognition. They found that when the use of a verbal label was prevented, memory for color and shape was good but memory for the conjunctions between color and shape was relatively poor. In a second study they instructed participants to focus on one dimension alone (either color or shape) and observed no effect of interference or facilitation from concurrent changes in the irrelevant dimension. Both results suggest independence between the features. (See also Heathcote, Walker, & Hitch, 1994; Isenberg, Nissen, & Marchak, 1990.) These conflicting conclusions might be resolved through an alternative explanation for the data of Luck and Vogel (1997) . Individual feature dimensions may be stored in parallel featurespecific memory stores similar or identical to the distributed processors postulated for initial visual processing before perceptual binding occurs. If the feature stores each have their own independent capacity, this parallel memory mechanism would result in the observed doubling and quadrupling of stored features as the number of feature dimensions increased, but without the binding or bound objects themselves being stored. To specifically test whether visual information is stored as integrated objects, the same features should be presented on the screen in the initial and the test displays, but on different trials the features should be differently paired. If participants detect this change in the binding, then it may be inferred that the binding information was maintained over the delay and that visual memory is primarily object based. However, if participants have more difficulty with this condition, in which the objects change while features do not, then another account, such as the parallel stores, may explain how visual working memory stores complex information. Luck and Vogel (1997) considered the parallel stores account and rejected it when they found that feature capacity was doubled even when participants remembered objects characterized by two features from within the same dimension. Specifically, they presented bicolored squares ( Figure 1B ). It is unlikely that parallel memory stores exist for each discriminable color, so the apparent chunking here supports the claim that visual memory stores object units. In the first two experiments of the present study, we attempted and failed to replicate Luck and Vogel's crucial finding that a color can be bound with another color to increase feature memory capacity.
Our remaining experiments therefore addressed the hypothesis that items defined by two separate dimensions are held as integrated object-file-like units in memory. Using a direct test for binding with objects defined by color and location, color and shape, and color and orientation, we found evidence that the binding information can be retained when it is required by the task. However, we also discovered conditions under which features are not bound or the binding information is lost, thus illuminating a possible source for the discrepant conclusions concerning visual memory storage in the literature to date.
In our experiments we used the same paradigm as was used by Luck and Vogel (1997) . An array of simple colored shapes was displayed for 150 ms. Then, following a 900-ms delay, a test display appeared that was either exactly the same as the original display or that differed from it by one or two features or by how the features were bound. In a whole-display test, the entire display was shown again at test. In a single-probe test, a single randomly chosen item was shown at test. Participants were scored for accuracy on these same-different discriminations (Figure 2 ).
Complex and changing visual scenes gleaned at each fixation from the visual environment are not always purposely memorized or labeled verbally. However, simple visual stimuli presented in laboratory conditions for deliberate memorization are likely to be recoded verbally, potentially changing the way visual information is remembered (Ceraso, 1985) . To reduce the possibility of verbal coding of the memory items, we required participants in all of our studies to rapidly repeat a word out loud during the initial display and delay periods (this is known as articulatory suppression; Baddeley, Lewis, & Vallar, 1984) .
Experiment 1
The color-color conjunction finding from Luck and Vogel's (1997) work ( Figure 1B ) argues compellingly in favor of a binding or chunking explanation for the doubling of feature memory capacity that the authors observed. Because of the importance of this finding, we first attempted to replicate this result.
In a pilot study performed in our lab (Wheeler & Treisman, 1999) , we presented participants with squares divided into two differently colored halves. We found no evidence for binding between the colored parts within an object. Accuracy scores declined as a function of the total number of colors presented rather than as a function of the number of objects presented. However, our bicolored squares differed from Luck and Vogel's stimuli, which consisted of a small center square of one color surrounded by a larger square of another color. It is possible that the greater perceptual or spatial integration of parts in these stimuli facilitates binding in memory. In a series of studies investigating visual attention to parts and wholes, Wolfe, Friedman-Hill, and Bilsky (1994) found efficient visual search for color-color conjunction targets when these could be described as a whole of one color with parts of another color, whereas search for targets best described as having two equal parts of different colors was not efficient. In Study 5 of that paper, Wolfe et al. varied the degree to which one colored part surrounded another. The more the outside part surrounded the inside part, the faster was search for a target object. Analogous differences in visual attention may also occur in visual memory.
We presented seven different bicolored square designs and two single-colored controls to each participant in separate blocks of trials. The first four bicolored designs varied in the degree to which the outer part surrounded the inner part, to parallel the stimuli used by Wolfe et al. (1994) . The next three designs differed in the level of integration between their parts. Each experimental condition presented three bicolored squares for a total of three objects and six colors on each trial. Accuracy scores in these conditions were compared with those for two control blocks, one in which six single-colored squares were presented and one in which three single-colored squares were presented. The feature-based storage hypothesis would predict equal performance on three bicolored squares and six single-colored squares. The object-based storage hypothesis would predict equal performance on the three bicolored squares and three single-colored squares, as observed by Luck and Vogel (1997) .
Method
Participants. Nine Princeton undergraduate volunteers (5 men and 4 women) participated in the 1-hr study for class credit or for pay. Participants in this and all subsequent experiments were naive to the experimental paradigm and reported normal or corrected-to-normal color vision.
Apparatus and stimuli. Visual stimuli for this and all subsequent experiments were displayed on a gray background on a 15" (38.1-cm) computer screen of a PowerMac 7300/200 running a MATLAB 5.2.0 program with the extensions provided by the high-level Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997) and the low-level VideoToolbox (Pelli, 1997) . The room was lit by standard overhead lighting. Responses were collected from a computer keyboard. Figure 3 (middle) shows the seven different kinds of bicolored squares and the two control conditions with singlecolored squares in two sizes. The bicolored squares each subtended a visual angle of 1.1°within a total possible display area subtending an 8.3°ϫ 8.6°r ectangle. Total pixel area was equal among parts within each square design. Large control squares subtended 1.1°, and small control squares subtended .73°(equal to the screen area occupied by the separate parts of the bicolored squares).
Displays consisted of three squares in all experimental blocks and in one control block. The other control block presented sets of six single-colored squares. The parts of the bicolored squares were each a different color, selected from the set of red, yellow, green, blue, violet, white, brown, and black, chosen to maximize discriminability. Colors were assigned randomly to the parts of the squares with the constraint that no color was repeated within the same display. The test displays all contained the same number of squares as the initial displays (whole-display test). The squares were scattered randomly within the display region, with the constraint that no two squares were within 1°of each other and with an invisible grid to control for consistency of item density across trials. Participants could move their eyes freely during the task.
Design. Each of the seven bicolored stimulus designs was presented in one block for 52 trials. The block order was counterbalanced between participants. Single-colored squares were presented in two control blocks, one with three squares in each display and one with six. On every trial the Figure 2 . Time course of the basic change-detection task used in all experiments in the present study. The test display was either exactly the same as the initial display or differed from it by one feature (or in some experiments, by two features). In whole-display conditions, the entire display was presented at test. In single-probe conditions, only one item was presented at test. Squares are not drawn to scale. Different fill patterns represent different solid colors. ISI ϭ interstimulus interval. sequence of displays was as follows: A small, black warning cross was presented at center screen for 506 ms. This was followed by a blank screen for 253 ms, which was followed by an initial display of squares flashed for 147 ms, then by a 906-ms blank interval, and finally by a test display that remained present until a response was made (Figure 2 ). At test, participants indicated by a keypress whether the whole display was the same as or different from the initial display. On 50% of the trials one part of one square had been changed to a new color not present elsewhere on the screen. Accuracy was the dependent measure, but reaction times were also recorded.
General procedure. (The following general procedure applies to all subsequent studies unless otherwise noted). Participants repeated the phrase Coca Cola three times per second during the initial display and memory delay period. They stopped and selected an answer when the test display appeared. Participants were asked to aim for accuracy, not speed. They heard a beep after incorrect responses and were told what percentage they had scored correct at the end of each block. At the beginning of the experiment, participants read through a detailed description of the study as the experimenter read it aloud. Then they practiced nine trials of each block type under the supervision of the experimenter and were given a chance to ask questions. At the conclusion of the study, participants were given an opportunity to comment and ask questions and then were debriefed.
Results and Discussion
An alpha level of .05 was used as the criterion for a significant difference for all statistical tests in this article. Accuracy (percentage correct) was the main dependent measure.
2 Memory accuracy did not differ significantly for small versus large squares in the two control conditions, small M ϭ 84%, large M ϭ 87%, paired t(9) ϭ 2.31, p Ͻ .17, so the results were pooled in further analyses.
Results show that none of the bicolored arrangements was stored as an object (Figure 3) . A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a main effect of condition, F(8, 64) ϭ 10.11, MSE ϭ 28.05, p Ͻ .0001 which was due to the difference between Control Condition 9, showing three single colored squares, and all other conditions. None of the bicolored conditions differed significantly from Control Condition 8, in which six single-colored squares were presented ( Figure 3 ). It is clear from Figure 3 that no further contrasts between bicolored designs were necessary. Neither surroundedness nor degree of integration nor part-shape similarity had an effect on memory accuracy. No arrangement of parts in any design, including that used by Luck and Vogel (1997) , demonstrated binding. All bicolored squares were presented in sets of three so that a total of six colors were present on the screen in each display. None of these sets showed accuracy levels that differed significantly from those for the six single-colored squares in Condition 8 (M ϭ 77% correct). When a repeated measures ANOVA was run without Control Condition 9 there were no significant effects, F(7, 56) ϭ 0.24, MSE ϭ 29.46, p Ͻ .98.
It is worth noting that the accuracy for three bicolored squares equals that obtained by Luck and Vogel (1997) for the presentation of six single-colored items, suggesting that the current result was not due to spurious factors inherent in the present observers or method. We were unable to replicate Luck and Vogel's evidence for object-based capacity limits for color-color conjunctions with any design type presented in this study. Instead, memory limits in the current experiment were constrained by the total number of features presented.
Experiment 2
In an attempt to resolve the conflicting results, we tried to replicate Luck and Vogel's (1997) original study more exactly. This involved three conditions presented to each participant in three blocks, one in which only large squares of a single color were presented, one in which only small squares of a single color were presented, and one in which bicolored squares with one surround color and one inside color were presented. Luck and Vogel found no difference in accuracy between these three conditions ( Figure 1B ).
Method
Participants. Twelve Princeton undergraduate volunteers (7 men and 5 women) participated in the 1-hr study for class credit or for pay.
Stimuli. Large single-colored squares subtended a visual angle of 1.1°, and small single-colored squares subtended 0.52°. Bicolored squares had a surround that subtended 1.1°, and a differently colored inside square that subtended 0.52°. The same display area limits used before-8.3°ϫ 8.6°-were used in this and all subsequent studies. Displays of two, four, or six squares were presented randomly intermixed and balanced within blocks. Four colors (red, green, blue, and violet) were used and were randomly selected for each display, allowing colors to be repeated within a display but not within an object. Stimuli were scattered randomly across the screen within the display region with the constraints that no two squares be within 1°of each other and that the density remain roughly the same across trials. In addition, we had participants repeat a verbal load to prevent verbal coding. Luck and Vogel (1997) had participants silently remember two digits throughout each trial and report them at the end.
Design. Three blocks of 120 trials each were presented to each participant in a counterbalanced order. One block displayed two, four, or six large single-colored squares; one block displayed two, four, or six small Figure 3 . Experiment 1 results. Mean change-detection accuracy percentages for seven different experimental bicolored square designs (1-7) and for two control conditions (8 -9). For Conditions 1-7 we presented displays of three bicolored squares and thus six total colors in three objects. For Condition 8 we presented six single-colored squares, and for Condition 9 we presented three single-colored squares. Error bars represent standard error. Square parts are not drawn to scale.
single-colored squares; and one block displayed two, four, or six bicolored squares. The entire display, with either one or no colors changed, was shown again at test (whole-display test), and participants indicated whether it was the same as or different from the initial display. Half the trials within each block and within each level of each factor were same trials and half were different trials. Accuracy was the dependent measure.
Results and Discussion
Again we failed to replicate Luck and Vogel's (1997) finding of equal accuracy with bicolored and single-colored squares (see Figure 4) . A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 22) ϭ 138.01, MSE ϭ 38.87, p Ͻ .0001, showing worse performance for bicolored than for singlecolored squares.
There was a significant main effect of set size, F(2, 22) ϭ 48.90, MSE ϭ 39.81, p Ͻ .0001. Change-recognition accuracy decreased as memory load increased in all conditions. This replicated the standard finding by Luck and Vogel (1997) and others. Means for Set Sizes 2, 4, and 6 averaged across condition were 93%, 86%, and 78% correct, respectively, suggesting that the visual memory system used for this task is limited in capacity to roughly three or four items. The large and small control conditions differed only at Set Size 6, in which the small squares produced lower accuracy. This drove a significant Condition ϫ Set Size interaction, F(4, 44) ϭ 8.88, MSE ϭ 17.87, p Ͻ .0001. As shown in Figure 4 , performance was actually worse with two bicolored squares than with four single-colored squares. This might suggest that the parts of the bicolored squares were harder to see. However, such an explanation is unlikely because in studies not included here the initial display was presented for as long as 500 ms with similar results, suggesting that perception was not a problem. Some participants reported focusing primarily on either the small central squares or the outer borders and ignoring the other component because remembering both was too difficult. This fact further bolsters the argument that participants remembered the inside and outside of bicolored squares not as parts of one unit but as separate items.
The reason for the discrepancy between our results with bicolored squares and those of Luck and Vogel (1997) is unclear. When we later observed Luck and Vogel's displays, we found that their colors were considerably brighter than those we used and that they were presented on a darker background. To speculate, this may have led to some perceptual blending of the colors, producing, for example, an impression of purple from a red and blue square. These emergent tints might have helped integrate the colors within objects. In addition we asked participants to engage in articulatory suppression to prevent verbal coding and gave feedback on performance, whereas the original Luck and Vogel work asked participants to silently remember two numbers during each trial. Otherwise, the conditions we used were the same.
Further studies could be conducted to isolate the reasons for our failure to replicate the specific color-color finding of Luck and Vogel (1997) , but it is clear from Experiments 1 and 2 that bicolored objects are not automatically stored as integrated chunks. Capacity within the feature dimension of color is limited by the number of colors presented rather than by the number of objects. To better understand the constraints of working memory capacity and to determine when, if ever, visual working memory holds information in a bound-object form, we next examined binding across dimensions.
Experiment 3A (Location and Color: Whole-Display Test)
The work by Luck and Vogel (1997) on multidimensional objects did not discriminate between parallel storage of the information in independent feature modules and the binding or chunking of features into integrated memory units. Luck and Vogel did not explicitly test for binding information. Participants may have maintained independent "lists" of colors and orientations without also retaining which color went with which orientation. In Experiment 3A we compared memory for color and location across four conditions. The first three conditions reproduced Luck and Vogel's experiments but we used different stimuli, and our last condition specifically tested memory for bindings ( Figure 5 ). The first two conditions examined change-detection accuracy for the features of color and location separately. At test, in different trials two new colors were presented in the color condition and two new locations were presented in the location condition. The third condition tested memory for both features at once by probing either color or location on randomly mixed trials. The fourth condition tested memory for the bindings by presenting the same colors and locations in the initial and test displays but re-pairing the colors and locations of two objects on half of the test trials. That is, in this binding condition the features remained constant, but the relationships between the features changed.
Another issue addressed by this experiment is the representation of location relative to other features. Location has a special role in neural cognition. There is evidence for many representations of space in the brain, some specialized for action and some for perception. These representations differ in the particular spatial coordinate framework in which locations are coded. For example, the location of a target entity can be spatially coded relative to its position on the retina, relative to a particular body part (the hand) that might reach for the entity, relative to other objects, or relative to the surrounding environment (Andersen, Snyder, Bradley, & Xing, 1997; Snyder, Grieve, Brotchie, & Andersen, 1998) . Loca- tion is also an important medium for spatial attention, and according to feature integration theory it is assumed to provide a basis for attentional binding of features into objects in perception (Treisman & Gelade, 1980) . The coding of space for action or for attentional selection may remain implicit. However, location can also be represented explicitly as one of many descriptive properties of an object, on the same conceptual level as, for example, color. In the present experiment, we did not distinguish between different coordinate systems but tested for explicit detection of changes in the on-screen location of stimuli across successive displays. In these conditions, location information must be identified and stored in the same way as other features.
Method
Participants. Twelve Princeton undergraduate volunteers (7 men and 5 women) participated in the 1-hr study for class credit.
Stimuli. The displays to be memorized contained either three or six single-colored squares, each in one of seven canonical colors (red, yellow, green, blue, violet, white, and brown). Each square subtended 0.73°and was placed randomly in one of eight possible locations equally spaced in an invisible square grid surrounding the center of the screen and subtending 8.3°ϫ 8.6°. This made the number of possible color and location values roughly equal (seven and eight). Colors were never repeated within any display at study or at test.
Design. The same time sequence and basic change-recognition paradigm were used as in previous experiments (warning 3 150-ms stimulus flash 3 900-ms delay 3 test; see Figure 2 ). For each trial at test, all squares were presented again (whole-display test), and participants indicated by a keypress whether the whole display was the same as or different from the initial display. The four conditions were blocked, with set size balanced across all levels and otherwise randomly intermixed within blocks. Each block of trials had a different set of instructions and was presented to participants in a counterbalanced order. There were 96 experimental trials per condition for 384 total trials. In addition to 8 trials of practice per condition at the beginning of the study, participants were also given 16 trials of practice just before each block, for a total of 96 practice trials.
The conditions tested were as follows: 1. Color only: Participants were told that only the color of squares could change. On different trials the same locations were occupied, but two squares had changed to two new colors not previously presented in the initial display.
2. Location only: Participants were told that only the location of squares could change. On different trials the same colors were presented, but two squares were moved to occupy two new previously unoccupied locations.
3. Either location or color: Participants were told that either the color or the location of squares could change. Half of the trials were location trials in which, on different trials, two squares were moved to new grid locations. Half of the trials were color trials in which, on different trials, two new colors were presented. These color and location trials were randomly intermixed with no indication of which type of information would be probed until test.
4. Binding location and color: At test, all the same colors were presented and all the same locations were occupied as at study. However, on different trials the binding, that is, the relationship between color and location, changed for two squares. In effect, two colored squares swapped locations. Participants were told that squares might switch places with each other and to treat such changes as different.
Response choices for every block were "same" if the presented stimulus display matched the memory display exactly and "different" if it did not match in some way. Participants indicated their choice on a standard keyboard and guessed if they were not sure. Fifty percent of trials were same and 50% were different, balanced across all levels of all factors. Accuracy was the dependent measure. Participants performed articulatory suppression and received feedback on performance as described in the General Procedure subsection under Experiment 1.
For the statistical analysis of color trials and location trials separately within the either condition, same trials were randomly preassigned to one condition or the other. An initial examination of the data revealed that none of the conditions required many trials of practice before performance leveled off. The practice trials were discarded, and the remaining trials were analyzed.
Results and Discussion
Three possible patterns for the results were considered: 1. Accuracy could be the same across all four conditions. This would occur if the color and location of each square are automatically bound in memory as one unit.
2. The color-only, location-only, and either conditions could give equal accuracy, whereas the binding condition could be worse. This would occur if color and location are not automatically bound together in one unit but are stored in parallel systems each with their own separate capacities.
3. Finally, accuracy could be lower in both the either and the binding conditions than in the color-only and location-only conditions. This would occur if the two features compete for the same storage capacity and are neither stored in parallel nor automatically bound.
Results shown in Figure 6A and 6B are most consistent with the second scenario described above and suggest that features were stored in parallel and that it takes extra resources to maintain the binding in memory. A repeated measures ANOVA showed a main effect of condition, F(3, 33) ϭ 56.53, MSE ϭ 25.73, p Ͻ .0001. A post hoc analysis revealed the pattern shown in Figure 6A . Change-recognition accuracy in the color-only condition was significantly worse than in the location-only condition. Accuracy in the either condition (M ϭ 92%) fell between accuracy for the location-only and color-only conditions, whereas accuracy in the binding condition was significantly worse than accuracy for all the other conditions. When the either trials are stored according to whether the individual trial tested for color or location, the location trials in the either condition are not significantly different from the locationonly trials, and the color trials are not significantly different from the color-only trials (see Figure 6A , either condition). Thus, memory for location does not interfere with remembering color, and memory for color does not interfere with remembering location in the either condition. This lack of interference between features in memory is also consistent with a memory mechanism that represents these features in parallel.
Participants were better at remembering the locations than they were at remembering the colors, both in the location-only condition and on the location trials within the either condition. There was a significant Set Size ϫ Condition interaction, F(3, 33) ϭ 15.77, MSE ϭ 15.30, p Ͻ .0001. A post hoc analysis showed that memory for location did not decrease as set size increased from three to six ( Figure 6B ). This may be due to a ceiling effect, a strategy effect, or a fundamental difference in the way spatial information is stored. One possibility is that participants stored the occupied locations as a single overall shape or configuration made by the squares on the screen rather than remembering each square's location individually. Unitary storage as a single pattern would explain why there was no decline in accuracy with a larger memory set size.
Accuracy was 11% lower in the binding condition (M ϭ 79%), in which participants were required to remember both features and their relationship, than in the worst single-feature condition (color only, M ϭ 89%). The increase in error rates in the binding condition was due almost entirely to an increase in failures to notice a change on trials in which squares switched locations. Isolating just the different trials shows that the change was noticed only 68% of the time when the binding changed in comparison to 88%, 98%, and 92% of the time for color, location, and either trials, respectively. Thus participants tended to treat displays in which all the correct features were presented at test as if they matched the initial display, despite the changes in binding.
There was a main effect of set size, F(1, 11) ϭ 67.60, MSE ϭ 20.98, p Ͻ .0001, such that recognition accuracy was worse with Set Size 6 (M ϭ 85%) than with Set Size 3 (M ϭ 93%). This effect again replicates capacity limits of visual memory reported by Irwin (1996) and Luck and Vogel (1997) .
Several points emerged from the data. The first three conditions gave results similar to those of Luck and Vogel (1997) . The amount of information remembered depends on the number of objects present rather than on the number of individual object features that must be remembered. Luck and Vogel argued from these results that perceptual features are bound into integrated units in memory. However, the either condition in their experiment did not usually require that multiple features be bound together. On most different trials in their experiment, new or additional values were presented at test. Thus it was possible for participants to maintain separate lists of the presented color values and the occu- pied locations. At test it was possible to search for a match in the corresponding dimension list without referring to the other dimension. 3 In the present experiments, changes in the object were isolated from changes in the features, and results show that participants were significantly impaired at detecting changes in the binding.
The present results on binding are consistent with those of Treisman and colleagues (Treisman, 1977; Treisman et al., 1977) . In a series of perceptual matching experiments with colored letters or schematic faces, the highest error rates occurred when the test stimuli presented the same feature values but re-paired them in different combinations. More recently, Simons (1996) presented arrays of four photographs of real objects or abstract shapes for memory in a successive same-different matching task. At test on different trials, Simons either changed the identity of one item, changed the overall configuration of the objects, or had two items switch places. The configuration changes were almost always noticed. The identity changes were more difficult to notice. However, performance was again worst in the condition in which items switched places even though twice as many objects were changing in this condition. In these experiments, as in our current study, performance in the binding condition was significantly worse than in all other conditions. 4 This suggests that integration of information for memory is not automatic and requires some extra capacity.
Experiment 3B (Location and Color: Single-Probe Test)
Although Treisman (1977) and Simons (1996) found evidence consistent with our results in Experiment 3A showing that change detection was most difficult when the relationships or bindings between items or features were changed, there is also evidence suggesting that objects are stored as integrated units in memory (Ceraso, 1985; Irwin, 1992) . What is the source of this conflict in the literature? On closer examination of the methods, we observed that Simons and Treisman both used a procedure similar to our whole-display design in which all the items are displayed again at test, whereas Ceraso and Irwin used a partial-report or recall procedure in which only one item or none was presented at test. The whole-display test conditions may have selectively impaired memory for binding information. To test this possibility, we conducted a single-probe version of Experiment 3A.
Method
Participants. Twelve Princeton undergraduate volunteers (5 men and 7 women) participated in the 1-hr study for class credit.
Stimuli. All stimulus parameters were the same as those in Experiment 3A except that an eighth color, black, was used as a neutral color in the location-only trials. The test stimulus for color trials was one singlecolored square presented at center screen, for location trials it was one black square in a grid location surrounding the center, and for binding trials it was one single-colored square in a previously occupied grid location.
Design. The same time sequence and basic change-recognition paradigms were used. Each participant completed four separate conditions presented in a counterbalanced order in four blocks of trials, one condition per block. Each block contained 96 experimental trials, for a total of 384 trials. Participants were also given 24 practice trials for each condition. Each block of trials had a different set of instructions.
1. Color only: Participants were told that only the color of squares would be tested. At test a single square was presented at center screen, a neutral location because squares never appeared there. Participants indicated whether the color of the square presented at test had been present in the previous display. On different trials, the square in the center was of a color not previously presented in the initial display.
2. Location only: Participants were told that only the location of squares would be probed. A single square was presented in a location on the screen in black, a neutral color because memory squares never appeared in black. Participants determined whether this black marker was in a location previously occupied in the initial display. On different trials, the marker square was presented in a previously unoccupied location.
3. Either location or color: Participants were told that either the color or the location of squares would be probed. Half the trials were location trials in which one black marker square (a neutral color) was presented in a location. Half the trials were color trials in which one single-colored square was presented at center screen (a neutral location). These color and location trials were randomly intermixed with no indication of which type of information would be probed until test.
4. Binding location and color: At test a colored square appeared in a particular location. The color had been present in the initial display, and the location had been occupied. Participants determined whether this colored square had been present in this particular location in the initial display. On different trials the colored square was presented in a previously occupied but wrong location. That is, in a sense, two colored squares switched places as in Experiment 3A, but only one was shown at test.
All other aspects were the same as in Experiment 3A.
Results and Discussion
The pattern of accuracy scores for the first three conditions (color, location, either) was similar to that in Experiment 3A ( Figure 6C ). However, accuracy in the single-probe binding block was better relative to that in the color-only block than it was under the whole-display conditions of Experiment 3A (compare Figures  6A and 6C ). In fact, accuracy in the binding condition ( Figure 6C , far right) was equal to that in the color-only condition ( Figure 6C , far left), as would be expected if binding the features required no additional memory capacity. There was a significant effect of condition, F(3, 33) ϭ 16.97, MSE ϭ 39.51, p Ͻ .0001. A post hoc analysis confirmed a significant difference between all conditions except between the color-only and binding conditions. Accuracy scores for the binding condition in Experiment 3B were significantly worse than those for the either condition but no worse than the color trials within the either condition, showing that memory for the binding information may be constrained by memory capacity for the more difficult feature. However, within the either condition the trials testing location (M ϭ 96% correct) and the trials testing color (M ϭ 87% correct) were again virtually identical to, and not significantly different from, the trials in the blocks in which only the single features were tested (location only, M ϭ 97% correct; color only, M ϭ 86% correct; Figure 6C , either condition), suggesting that the features still also maintained a separate representation.
There was again a significant difference between the memory set size of three (M ϭ 95% correct) and the memory set size of six (M ϭ 85% correct), F(1, 11) ϭ 75.10, MSE 32.20, p Ͻ .0001. However there was also a Condition ϫ Set Size interaction, F(3, 33) ϭ 8.84, MSE ϭ 35.20, p Ͻ .001, because again the locationonly condition showed no decline in accuracy as set size increased.
Results with this single-probe test suggest that binding information can be accurately retained during the memory delay and that the previous poor performance on the binding condition in Experiment 3A could be due to some form of interference from the whole-display test. This occurs despite the possible advantage of contextual cues from surrounding items, making the reduced accuracy in the whole-display condition all the more surprising. We need to determine both (a) what is causing this decrement in change detection in the binding condition with whole-display but not single-probe tests and (b) why binding information is more vulnerable to this factor than is individual feature information.
Participants may maintain different information in the feature conditions (color only, location only, and either) than in the binding condition. There may be two types of information storage available: (a) parallel feature stores, each with their own independent capacity, and (b) a different mechanism for binding information or for integrated object representations. In the feature conditions, in which the binding information is not required by the task, features may be remembered in parallel stores, each with their own separate capacity limit. In the binding condition, when the task requires object memory, the features may still be remembered in parallel feature stores, but in addition the binding or links between these features may be maintained through a second and different mechanism that relies on a separate limited resource such as attention. If only the binding condition depends on this attention resource, then this could explain why the binding condition suffers from interference in whole-display tests. We tested these possibilities through further experiments. Experiment 4A (Color and Shape: Whole-Display Test)
A comparison of Experiments 3A and 3B shows that under whole-report test conditions some mechanism causes the binding information to be erased, interfered with, or otherwise rendered irretrievable at test. Experiment 4 expanded our studies to the new features of color and shape to determine whether the same difference in change-detection accuracy for binding information occurs between whole-display (Experiment 4A) and single-probe test formats (Experiment 4B). In Experiment 3 we kept the factor of shape constant, always presenting squares, and changed only the color and location of these squares. The complementary manipulation in Experiments 4A and 4B would be to keep the location values of objects constant and change only their colors and shapes. Keeping location constant could be accomplished by a serial presentation of colored shapes for memory in one location, but this adds a temporal factor to the memory task that we chose not to explore here. Instead we made the location information noninformative by always changing the location of shapes between initial display and test. All other aspects were similar to Experiment 3.
Method
Participants. Eight Princeton undergraduate volunteers (3 men and 5 women) participated in the 1-hr study for pay.
Stimuli. All stimuli and probe items were single-colored shapes subtending a visual angle of approximately 0.73°. Two, four, or six shapes from a set of eight simple shapes (Figure 7) , were presented in different colors selected from the following eight: red, yellow, green, blue, violet, white, brown, and black. The set sizes were randomly intermixed within blocks with the constraint of balanced presentation across all levels. Shapes were placed randomly in the eight possible locations of a square grid subtending the 8.3°ϫ 8.6°region and were randomly jittered (up, down, right, left, or diagonally) within their assigned squares. Colors and shapes were never repeated within any display at study or at test. At test an entire display of two, four, or six shapes was presented.
Design. The same time sequence and basic change-recognition paradigm were used. For each trial all shapes were presented again at test, and participants indicated by a keypress whether the whole display was the same as or different from the initial display. Between study and test, all shapes randomly switched places with each other. That is, for the test display each shape was put in a previously occupied location randomly assigned without replacement. The locations were always changed in this way to prevent participants from using location as an additional cue or anchor for change recognition. There were four main conditions, blocked, each with 108 experimental trials, for a total of 432 trials. Participants were also given 18 practice trials for each condition. Each block of trials had a different set of instructions and was presented in a counterbalanced order. At test, all the shapes were presented on the screen again in whole-display test format. For all conditions, participants were told that the items would move around on the screen between study and test. They were told to ignore this change and to focus on the shape and color of the items to determine their answers.
1. Color only: Participants were told that only the color of items could change. On different trials at test, the same shapes were present but two items had changed to two new colors not previously presented in the initial display.
2. Shape only: Participants were told that only the shape of items could change. On different trials at test, the same colors were present but two items had changed to two new shapes not previously presented in the initial display.
3. Either shape or color: Participants were told that either the color or the shape of items could change. Half the trials were shape trials in which, on different trials, two squares changed to two new shapes at test. Half the trials were color trials in which, on different trials, two new colors were presented. These color and shape trials were randomly intermixed with no indication of which type of information would be probed until test.
4. Binding shape and color: All the same colors and shapes were presented at test. However, on different trials the binding, that is, the relationship between color and shape, changed for two items. In effect, two shapes switched colors with each other or, equivalently, two colors switched shapes.
All other aspects of design, such as verbal load, feedback, and accuracy as the main dependent measure, remained the same as in Experiment 3. We observed the same general pattern of results for the features of shape and color as we observed in the previous experiment for color and location, with one important difference (see Figures 8A  and 8B ). For whole-display conditions, in which all the shapes were presented again at test, accuracy scores in the binding condition (M ϭ 70%) were again significantly worse than those in the other three conditions; main effect of condition, F(3, 21) ϭ 22.23, MSE ϭ 76.09, p Ͻ .0001. Thus the impairment to the binding condition under whole-display test conditions generalizes from the features of color and location to the features of color and shape. The color-only condition had the highest accuracy (M ϭ 91%). The shape-only and either conditions did not differ significantly (shape only, M ϭ 80%; either, M ϭ 79%; see Figure 8A ). There was also a significant difference in accuracy between color trials and shape trials within the either condition ( Figure 8A ). Memory for both color and shape declined as set size increased: main effect of set size, F(2, 14) ϭ 81.08, MSE ϭ 47.31, p Ͻ .0001. There was a significant interaction of set size with condition because, perhaps spuriously, there was no decline in performance on the either condition between Set Size 4 and Set Size 6, F(6, 42) ϭ 3.42, MSE ϭ 39.53, p Ͻ .01 ( Figure 8B ).
One interesting difference between the results of Experiments 3A and 4A was that although the color and location of items could be remembered in parallel with no mutual interference in the either condition of Experiment 3A, change-detection accuracy for the color and shape of items was somewhat reduced when both had to be remembered relative to when each feature was remembered alone (cf. Figure 8A with Figure 6A ). In a repeated measures ANOVA with the factors of feature (color, shape) and relationship (remembered separately-the color-only and shape-only conditions; remembered together-the either condition) there was a main effect of relationship, F(1, 7) ϭ 11.78, MSE ϭ 29.25, p Ͻ .05, and a main effect of which feature was remembered, feature, F(1, 7) ϭ 790.03, MSE ϭ 21.01, p Ͻ .01, with no significant interaction, F(1, 7) ϭ 5.28, MSE ϭ 22.71, p Ͼ .60. Accuracy scores for color trials and shape trials within the either condition were worse than those for trials in the color-only and shape-only conditions (cf. Figure 8A either and Figure 6A either). This decline may be because color and shape share more capacity than color and location. This would be consistent with neuroimaging and single-cell studies showing, for example, that at later stages of visual processing, separate areas are involved in processing spatial and object information (Smith et al., 1995; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982) , whereas single cells in the inferior temporal cortex respond to specific patterns of shape and color together (Tanaka, 1993) . In summary, it appears that whereas the features of color and screen location do not interfere with each other in visual memory, the features of shape and color do interfere to some extent. Experiment 4B (Color and Shape: Single-Probe Test) Experiment 4A revealed that the whole-display test condition led to a decline in performance on the binding condition for the features of color and shape, as it did earlier for the features of color Figure 8 . Mean change-recognition accuracy percentages for the features of shape and color in Experiment 4A with a whole display presented at test (Panels A and B) and Experiment 4B with a single probe at test (Panels C and D) . Bars labeled with the same lowercase letter are not significantly different from each other. Again, memory for the binding condition was impaired when the whole display was presented at test relative to memory for the other conditions (Panel A) and in comparison with when a single-probe test was presented (Panel C). Error bars represent standard error. and location. Experiment 4B paralleled Experiment 3B and investigated single-probe conditions with color and shape to determine whether the binding decline was again specific to whole-display test conditions.
Stimuli. All stimulus parameters were the same as those in Experiment 4A except that an eighth color, black, was used as a neutral color in the shape trials and one shape, a square, was used as the neutral shape for the color trials. On shape trials, at test one black shape was presented at center screen. Center screen was a neutral location because display items were never presented there. On color trials, at test one single-colored square (a neutral shape) was presented at center screen. On binding trials, one single-colored shape was presented at center screen.
Design. The same four conditions were used as in Experiment 4A except that a single central probe was presented at test rather than a whole display. For the color-only condition one single-colored square was presented at test. In the shape-only condition one black shape was presented at test. In the either condition half the trials were shape test trials in which a black shape was presented at center screen and half were color test trials in which a colored square was presented at center screen. In the binding condition one single-colored shape was presented at center screen. Each participant completed four blocks of 108 experimental trials each, for a total of 432 trials. Participants were also given 24 practice trials for each condition. Each block had a different set of instructions and was presented in a counterbalanced order to every participant.
Results and Discussion
As with color and location, the selective impairment of binding under whole-display conditions no longer appeared when a single color-shape probe was presented at test ( Figure 8C ). There was a main effect of condition, F(3, 33) ϭ 15.42, MSE ϭ 47.00, p Ͻ .0001, reflecting better performance in the color-only condition than in the other three conditions, none of which differed significantly. Most important, accuracy in the binding condition with a single-probe test was again not significantly different from accuracy in the worst feature condition, which was shape. There was also the standard effect of set size, F(2, 22) ϭ 101.15, MSE ϭ 74.99, p Ͻ .0001. Color showed a smaller decrease in accuracy with increasing set size than did the other conditions, resulting in a significant interaction of set size with condition, F(6, 66) ϭ 4.19, MSE ϭ 30.38, p Ͻ .01 (see Figure 8D) .
In both Experiments 3 and 4 it is important to point out that whole-display tests did not impair change detection in features relative to single-probe tests (the color-only, shape-only, and either conditions). The interference from whole-display tests was restricted to memory for binding.
Experiment 5 (Whole Display: Decision Making or Interference?)
What is the underlying cause of this repeatedly observed difference in accuracy in the binding conditions under whole-display versus single-probe tests, and why is it specific to the binding condition? The initial display and the memory delay were the same in both, so the difference in performance may arise at the time of test or retrieval rather than at encoding.
One possible explanation is the higher decision load with wholedisplay tests. Three or six items instead of just one had to be checked for changes, increasing the possibility of errors. Luck and Vogel (1997) used cues at test to see whether decision making affected the decline in performance on memory for simple features. However, they did not have a binding condition in any of their work because they did not test that issue directly. Therefore the question of whether binding memory was helped by cues and the specific question of why there is a difference in our current studies between whole-display and single-probe remains unanswered. To test the decision-making account, Experiment 5 compared two whole-display conditions, one in which a single item was cued at test and one with no cue, just as in Experiments 3A and 4A. If the difficulty of having multiple items was due to decision-level problems, then cuing one item for decision at test should alleviate the problem. In this experiment we used color and location as the features to be tested.
Method
Stimuli and design. Most stimulus parameters were the same as for Experiment 3A. Three or six single-colored squares were flashed on the screen for memory, and then after the 900-ms delay all the items were displayed again. In the cued test condition, a single black line 0.4°long pointed diagonally toward one of the squares in the test display. The cue line was placed directly adjacent to and pointing to the upper right-hand corner of the cued square. Only the binding condition was presented because this was the condition that showed the impairment in wholedisplay test. Half the trials were different trials, in which the relationship between the color and its location changed. Two blocks were presented in a counterbalanced order to each participant. Each block had 96 trials, for a total of 192 trials, and 40 practice trials, for a total of 80 practice trials.
1. Whole-display binding: At test the items were displayed again, and participants decided whether the whole display was exactly the same as the initial one or differed in the relationship of any color to its location. On different trials, two colored squares switched places at test. This was exactly like the binding condition in Experiment 3A.
2. Cued report: At test all the items were displayed again and a single square was cued with a black line pointing to its corner. Participants determined whether this specific single color-location pairing was the same as it was in the initial display. On different trials, two colored squares switched places at test, and one of those squares was cued.
Results and Discussion
Cuing a single item at test did not help performance in comparison with a whole-display test with no cue. In fact, changerecognition accuracy was slightly worse when a single item in a whole display was cued at test than when the whole display was presented without a cue, F(1, 11) ϭ 6.34, MSE ϭ 17.10, p Ͻ .05 (whole display, M ϭ 82% accuracy; cued, M ϭ 78%). It is unlikely then that an accumulation of decision-making errors was the major source of the problem for binding information when a whole display was presented.
Why then was there a deficit in change detection for binding information in whole-display conditions? The initial display was presented for 150 ms, and the delay between study and test (interstimulus interval) was 900 ms. Thus, both the display and the delay parameters were beyond the reach of standard backward visual masking and iconic memory (Breitmeyer, 1984) . One possibility is that the decline in binding performance when multiple items are presented at test is due to "perceptual distraction." Visual memory for binding may depend on focused attention to maintain the links between features during the delay, just as, according to feature integration theory, focused attention is required when multiple objects are present to correctly bind features for initial perception (see also Wolfe's [1999] suggestion of inattentional amnesia). The presentation of a whole display of multiple items at test might require attention for the correct perception of this new set of objects. Thus resources needed to maintain the initial binding information would be diverted instead to perceive the multiple test items, making the original bindings held in memory "fall apart." Feature information, on the other hand, could be maintained during the short delay without active attention. This account emphasizes the diversion of attention to the test display, resulting in the selective destruction of object files that maintain representations of the bindings in memory. This implies that visual memory and visual perception share some of the same mechanisms.
General Discussion
The present study focused on visuospatial working memory and its capacity constraints-specifically, on whether and how information is integrated in visual working memory and the resulting effect this has on memory capacity. Integration, also referred to as binding or chunking, involves the reorganization of bits of information to create more complex but unified representations of previously distributed information. Although initially requiring focused attention or other resources to create the bound units, integration may ultimately increase information-processing capacity, so it is important to understand how this occurs. The binding problem manifested in object perception and visual memory is an example of a more general problem that networks of attention solve in other cognitive tasks. Binding of visual features may parallel binding of complex relations and associations. Thus, a solution to the particular problem of binding in visual memory may help illuminate similar processes in other kinds of memory, as well as in language, problem solving, or decision making.
The current experiments used change-detection paradigms to determine whether visual information is automatically stored in the form of bound objects in short-term visual memory. The literature to date contains conflicting conclusions concerning binding in visual memory. Irwin (Irwin & Andrews, 1996) developed a framework of integrated units in memory based on the concept of object files. Luck and Vogel (1997) also argued for bound object units in memory, and their results suggested that memory capacity for features may be unlimited once objects are bound. However, others have concluded that features are registered independently and may remain available even when memory for their conjunctions is lost. Data have shown that the bindings between features are often poorly retained (Isenberg et al., 1990; Simons, 1996; Stefurak & Boynton, 1986; Treisman et al., 1977) . Luck and Vogel (1997) based their conclusion on changedetection data showing that the amount of visual information that can be remembered over short delays is limited only by the number of objects presented and is independent of the number of features. A display with four complex objects, each with multiple features (up to four features per object in their studies), required no more memory capacity than a display with four simple objects, each defined by a single feature. Although it is quite striking that feature capacity can expand in this way, it cannot be concluded from Luck and Vogel's data that bound objects are the default units of storage in visual memory or even that information about the binding of features is stored at all. The observed doubling and quadrupling of feature capacity as new dimensions are added could be explained as well by independent parallel feature stores as by storage of integrated objects. Luck and Vogel (1997) rejected a parallel-storage account because they had results showing that objects defined by two values within the same dimension (bicolored squares) also doubled the storage capacity relative to objects with a single value. However, in Experiments 1 and 2 of the present study, using a variety of different spatial arrangements of colored feature parts, we failed to replicate Luck and Vogel's finding for bicolored squares (cf. Figure 1B with Figures 3 and 4) . Memory performance in our within-dimension experiments was limited by the number of features and not by the number of objects. Greater capacity limits within dimensions than between dimensions have also been reported in the perceptual literature (Duncan, 1989 (Duncan, , 1993 Treisman, 1969; Wing & Allport, 1972) .
Using features from two different dimensions (color and location in Experiment 3A and color and shape in Experiment 4A), we tested memory specifically for binding. In three conditions, one or both features could change between study and test, whereas in the fourth condition the binding between features could change. Change-detection performance in the feature conditions was similar to that observed by Luck and Vogel (1997) . However, accuracy in the critical binding condition was worse, suggesting that the binding information is not easily or always maintained in visual memory (see Figures 6A and 8A ). These findings are consistent with the existence of parallel stores in which features each have their own independently limited capacity.
Investigating reasons for discrepancies in the literature about binding in memory, we noticed that previous studies showing poor memory for binding used a test display in which all the items were presented again at test, whereas studies showing that binding was well maintained presented a single test item or used free recall. To determine whether the type of test display was a factor, Experiments 3 and 4 compared a whole-display test, presenting all the items again at test, with a single-probe test, presenting only a single item at test, and found that the decrement in binding occurred only with whole-display tests (see Figures 6 and 8) . The observed difference, specifically in the binding condition, between whole-display and single-probe test scores revealed one source for the conflict in the literature on binding in visual memory. The current experiments show that binding information can be maintained and sometimes is. However, memory for the binding is selectively affected by the perceptual conditions at test, whereas memory for the feature information is not similarly vulnerable. The two kinds of information, the basic features and the binding, are remembered through two separate mechanisms.
There are four general ways in which visual information might be stored in visual working memory. First, there is the strong sense of binding, in which features always coalesce to create new structural units that are then maintained in visual memory as new entities at no cost in terms of memory capacity or other processing resources. This chunking interpretation predicts that additional information will be maintained "for free" after it has been chunked into one memory unit. Second, features may be stored separately but with an additional capability for linking the features. Such binding information would be maintained by a separate mechanism at no extra cost to feature memory capacity. Third, both the features and the binding information may be stored within the same memory system but at a cost to feature capacity because the binding and feature storage compete. Finally, the features may be stored separately and with no linking information at all. That is, even if an object is attended to and perceived, its features always come unbound in memory.
The final model is ruled out because Experiments 3B and 4B show that information about the original binding of features can be maintained under certain circumstances. The first model is also ruled out because there are conditions where binding fails to increase the capacity available (when features come from the same dimension, as they did in Experiments 1 and 2), and there are also conditions in which the binding is lost yet the features survive (the whole-display tests of Experiments 3 and 4). The third model, in which binding is stored but competes for storage capacity directly with feature information, is also not supported by the data. The studies with single-probe tests (Experiments 3B and 4B) show that the binding between features can be remembered while performance remains as good as, not worse than, the more difficult of the two features when tested individually.
We propose a framework based on the second model. It assumes that feature values from different dimensions are each stored in parallel in their own dimension-specific cache, within which feature values compete for limited capacity representation but between which there is little or no competition. The binding information can also be maintained if it is required by the task. Although maintenance of the binding costs little or nothing in terms of feature capacity, it does depend on other limited attentional resources. Anything that competes for this attentional resource can interfere with binding memory performance.
The data are consistent with this dual-storage mechanism account. The fact that visual memory capacity is limited by the number of multidimensional objects rather than by the number of features presented fits well with the idea of parallel storage of features, in which each dimension has its own independent memory capacity. Objects defined by parts differing within the same dimension of color cannot take advantage of this parallel storage because features within the same dimension compete. On the other hand, there was no interference between color and location (Figures 6A and 6C) in the either condition relative to the singlefeature conditions. Each feature dimension filled to its own capacity limits, seemingly independent from the other features. In Experiments 1 and 2, memory performance was limited by the basic feature capacity because all the features were colors, whereas in Experiments 3 and 4 additional features were remembered when they came from independent feature dimensions. There was a small cost overall to remembering both color and shape at the same time, although each feature still gave different accuracy scores, implying separate underlying capacity limits ( Figures 8A and 8C) .
In Experiments 3 and 4 there was a drop in accuracy on the binding condition relative to the either and single-feature conditions only when whole-display tests were presented. This selective fragility of the binding information was at first perplexing. However, a review of the literature revealed that this phenomenon is robust and actually explains conflicting conclusions about the maintenance of binding information in visual memory. Experiments in which memory is tested with recall or with a single test item have generally supported binding in memory (Ceraso, 1985; Irwin, 1991 Irwin, , 1992 , whereas those involving a complex display presented at test (e.g., Treisman et al., 1977) have concluded that binding information is poorly maintained.
The binding impairment with whole-display tests cannot be attributed to slower initial encoding or consolidation of this information because binding performance was not impaired when the test display was a single item. The single-probe and whole-display conditions in the present experiments differed only at the time of retrieval, suggesting that something about the test displays caused the difference in performance on binding. Experiment 5 showed that cued recognition with whole-display tests was no better than noncued recognition, ruling out an account in terms of greater decision-making demands. The remaining possible accounts for the binding decrement are interference from the whole-display test or a change in storage strategy in anticipation of the different test conditions.
We have described in the Discussion section of Experiment 5 a way in which this interference might occur-loss of the binding as a result of attentional distraction. Within the object-file framework (Kahneman et al., 1992) , the whole-display test may be taken by the visual system as an update for the bound object files it maintains from the initial display, resulting in the replacement of the original contents. Or the whole-display binding decrement may be best described as due to perceptual distraction. Attention is required to maintain the binding information between features during delays in visual memory, just as it is required to encode binding information in visual perception. When a display with multiple items is presented at test, the attention resources that were maintaining the binding information in memory are reallocated to create new links so that the complex whole display presented at test can be perceived. In contrast, when only one item is presented at test, it can be perceived with little need to redirect attention away from the memory objects. Cuing one item in the wholedisplay test is no better than having no cue because the item cannot be located before the diversion of attention from the stored items to the new display.
The attentional distraction account can be tested by comparing the effects of an attentionally demanding task during the delay period with the effect of whole-display tests to see whether it also disrupts binding while leaving feature memory intact. Stefurak and Boynton (1986) asked participants to remember colored animal forms and had them perform an attentionally demanding mental arithmetic task during the delay period until a single item was presented at test. The purpose of the mental arithmetic was to prevent participants from naming the objects, but it probably had a secondary effect, which was to direct the focus of attention away from the memory items. As would be predicted by the perceptual distraction idea, participants were good at detecting the appearance of new colors or animal shapes at test but "memory for colorshape conjunctions was totally absent" when attention was distracted (Stefurak & Boynton, 1986, p. 164) , even though there was only a single test item.
In summary, we suggest that separate mechanisms limit shortterm visual memory for features on the one hand and for bindings between these features on the other. First, there is a basic capacity limit for storing features from any given dimension. In Experiments 1 and 2 total feature memory capacity was low because all features came from the same dimension and competed for memory space, whereas in Experiments 3 and 4 different feature types did not compete for the same memory capacity. Second, there is an attention-dependent resource limit for binding feature information and maintaining it in memory. Information about the binding does not compete for capacity space with the feature values. However, because binding is dependent on a more general attention resource, it is more vulnerable to interference. Binding information can be lost when new visual objects are presented and attention is withdrawn, causing bound objects to fall apart. Bound visual objects may survive in memory across distraction only when they are recoded into a nonvisual form, such as a verbal label.
There is support for this model in both the behavioral and the neuroscience literature. The limit of three or four items in working memory capacity observed in the present studies is also, probably not coincidentally, the maximum number of items that may be attended to simultaneously (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988) , consistent with the idea that attention is critically involved in visual memory.
The change-blindness literature shows that attention to the changing attribute in a visual scene is required at least during the initial display to ensure accurate change detection (Rensink, 2000c; Rensink et al., 1997) . Attention may also be required to hold on to a visual representation during the memory delay. In this case, failures to notice changes would be due to forgetting a representation after it had already been formed and so could be described as inattentional amnesia (Wolfe, 1999) . Both Wolfe (1999) and Rensink (2000a Rensink ( , 2000b posited that if attention is removed, objects fall apart into their constituent features. If the two kinds of information, the basic features and the binding, are remembered through two separate mechanisms, it may be that both simplefeature capacity and binding are limited by the amount of information that can be initially encoded into a proper working memory representation, similar to what the term inattentional blindness (Mack & Rock, 1998) implies in attention. In addition, the comparatively poorer performance on binding memory in some conditions may be due to a kind of inattentional amnesia, in which additional loss of the bound object representations, above and beyond the basic encoding limit, occurs when attention is withdrawn during the memory delay itself.
There is converging evidence from neuroscience experiments that is consistent with the framework proposed above for binding in visual memory. At the neural level the dissociation in attentional demands on working memory for features and for their binding could be explained by the synchrony hypothesis proposed by Singer et al. (1997; Singer & Gray, 1995) . They proposed that binding is maintained by synchronous firing of neurons that code for the features of the same object. For example, if the objects are a red vertical line and a green horizontal line, cells representing verticalness and cells representing redness would fire in synchrony, whereas cells representing greenness and horizontalness would fire at another frequency. Luck and Vogel (1998) pointed out that there may be a limit to the number of distinct firing frequencies available before spurious synchronization between features belonging to different objects occurs. In contrast, adding more features to a single object means only that more cells are firing at the same frequency, and so there is no comparable limit to the number of features within objects.
Evidence from our own lab obtained from functional magnetic resonance imaging studies in a visual memory experiment showed that bound objects are not automatically represented and that when the binding must be remembered, the same areas are recruited that are also involved in focusing attention in visual perception tasks. The binding condition, when contrasted with the either condition, differentially involved specific areas of parietal and frontal cortex that have been shown to be involved in visual shifts of attention and attention to conjunctions (Wheeler & Treisman, 2000) . This is consistent with the idea that binding in visual memory requires the maintenance of attention over the delay. It is interesting to note that Brodmann's Area 10, an area in the frontal pole, is shown to be involved both in binding visual features and in the integration of faces and names for memory (Wheeler, 2000) , as well as the integration of other visual and verbal information (Prabhakaran, Narayanan, Zhao, & Gabrieli, 2000) . Thus, some of the same mechanisms involved in integration of visual information in working memory are also employed in integrating other kinds of information in working memory.
It is possible to use these and other neuroscience findings to articulate a neural basis for the proposed model that explains the behavioral data. Feature information, whether a color, a name, or a sound, may be maintained for working memory by brain areas that are specialized for processing particular content. For example, brain areas involved in perception may serve a function similar to the concept expressed by Baddeley's (1992) visuospatial sketchpad for visual memory (Ungerleider, 1995) , and as one attentional maintenance hypothesis for visual working memory has argued, selective spatial attention may be the rehearsal mechanism for spatial working memory just as Broca's area and the premotor area are thought to be rehearsal areas for the content of verbal working memory (Awh, Jonides, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998 ). This specific content information is then integrated by feedback signals from frontal brain areas commonly implicated in working memory and attention tasks. The mechanisms controlling this network would serve as the attention resource for integration of this separate content (for a description of such attention networks, see Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000) .
It is tempting to think that the brain maintains an explicit detailed representation of what the visual world presents to the retina. However, there is little point to remembering every visual detail that crosses the retina; only behaviorally relevant information need be maintained. Consequently, short-term visual memory involves a great deal of selective synthesis by the brain. We have suggested a framework to describe how the information that does get represented in this kind of limited visual memory may be stored. Specifically, maintaining an explicit representation of the binding of visual features requires focused attention over the delay period. In this way, some of the same mechanisms that are involved in visual perception are also involved in visual working memory. More broadly, the present studies used simple paradigms inspired by the visual attention literature to investigate mechanisms involved in the maintenance and manipulation of information active in working memory. The model we have proposed may apply beyond the visual domain as a general account of the constraints on conscious cognition at the intersection of attention and working memory.
